STATE v. DONOHUE.
In this case it appears that Dr.Miller had attended the medical lectures
of Prof. Agnew and others, and after
graduation had published a book
which was an epitome of the said
lectures, together with those of other
professors, the matter taken from
each professor being placed in a separate "part" of the book. The names
of the professors wereplaced upon the
title-page. Dr. Agnew, whose work
appeared as Part 2, applied for an
injunction, which was granted by the
Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia,
whose action was sustained by the
Supreme Court so far as it enjoined
(1) the sale, circulation, and publication of any book announcing literally or substantially that it was "An
Epitome on Surgery by D. Hayes Agnew, M. D., LL. D.; (2) and after
sale, circulation or publication of
Part 2 of the book (Dr. Agnew's
portion) described in the bill, but
was reversedso far as it enjoined the
sale or circulation of "any other
book containing the substance of
lectures delivered by complainant at
the University of Pennsylvania." It

is very much to be regretted that the
courtgave no opinion, for the remark,
"We see no sufficient reason for now
disturbing the special injunction
granted, except as to the latter part of
the second prayer," can hardlybe considered an opinion, and we are unfortunately left in the dark as to the
grounds upon which the court proceeded in a very interesting case, and
which, so far as we know, is the only
one involving the precise question
which has arisen in this country. It
is thought, however, that the review
of the case above cited and a consideration of the reason of the matter
will satisfy the mind that the decision of the case in Caird v. Sime is
correct, and that by a delivery of a
college lecture the lecturer does not
lose his property in his work, at least
as regards the world at large-whether
he could restrain publication if it
were undertaken by the university of
which he is an officer, is a matter
which might be worthy of consideration and which would depend for its
decision upon the terms upon which
he held his chair or lecturership.
Heimmy BuDn.
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STATE v. DONOHUE.
If an animal having no natural propensity to be vicious commits an injury to the person of another, the owner is not liable unless he had previous
knowledge of the vicious disposition.
The fact that the owner of a dog permitted him to be at large on the
highway when he inflicted the injury sued for, will not make the owner liable
without proof of the scienter.

CERTioRARi to review a judgment for defendant in an ac-

tion for damages for plaintiff's having been bitten by a dog belonging to defendant. Affrmed.
Argued before VAN SYCKEL, MAGIE and PA.KxE, JJ.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
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Messrs. . W. & J. K. Field,for plaintiff.
Mr. C. F. Lighthipe, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAff SYCKEL, J.-In July, 1885, the plaintiff, while walking
in the public street in front of the defendant's premises, was
bitten by the defendant's dog, which was lying unmuzzled on
the sidewalk. The night being dark, the plaintiff did not see
the dog until he sprung upon and bit her.
It also appears that a city ordinance prohibited the running
at large of dogs in the street at any time without a muzzle.
The plaintiff insists that the dog, lying upon the sidewalk in
violation of the city ordinance, must be regarded as a nuisance, and
that, therefore, the owner is liable for any injury done by him.
Under the authority of Durant v. Palmer, 5 Dutch. 544, it
may be that if the plaintiff, while on her way in the public street,
had unavoidably fallen over the dog, and injured herself, the
owner of the dog would be liable in damages for such injury.
But whether he is liable for damages inflicted by the biting of
the dog must depend, I think, upon the existence of the necessity of proving the secienter. The fact that the defendant acted in
breach of the city ordinance subjects him only to the penalty
prescribed therefor ; it is not a circumstance upon which recovery in this suit can be supported.
The only question in the case is whether this suit will lie,
without proof that the defendant had knowledge of the vicious
propensity of the dog.
The rule has generally prevailed in the English courts that
if an animal having no natural propensity to be vicious commits
an injury the owner is not liable unless he has knowledge of his
disposition.
In Mason v. KYeeling, 12 Mod, 332, Lord HOLT said that the
law takes notice, that a dog is not of fierce nature, but rather the
contrary; and he therefore sustained the demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration because it did not allege the scienter.
In Beckv. Dyson,4 Camp. 199, Lord ELLENBOROUGH directed
a nonsuit, because the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the
jury in inferring that the defendant knew that the dog was accustomed to bite.
In a like case Lord ABniGER nonsuited, because it did not ap-
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pear that the owner had knowledge of the vicious propensity of
his dog: Bogau v. iSharpe, 7 Carr. & P. 755.
In .Buxentine v. Sharp, 3 Salk. 12, the reporter says: "The
plaintiff declared that the defendant kept a bull which used to
run at men, but did not say sciens or scienter; and this was adjudged ill after a verdict, because the action will not lie unless
the owner knew the quality of his bull; and it cannot be intended that this was proved at the trial, because the plaintiff is
not bound to prove more than is laid in his declaration."
Cox v. Burbrdge,13 Com. Bench, N. S. 430, was a case where
the defendant's horse, being on a highway, .kicked the plaintiff,
a child playing there. There was no evidence to show how the
horse came on the highway or that he was accustomed to kick.
The plaintiff obtained a verdict; whereupon, the defendant was
granted a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit.
Chief Justice ERLE, with whom all the judges agreed, said:
"Even if there was negligence on the part of the owner of the
horse, I do not see how that is at all connected with the damage
of which the plaintiff complains. It appears that the horse was
on the highway, and that without anything to account for it, he
struck out and injured the plaintiff. I take the well-known distinction to apply here: that the owner of an animal is answerable for any damage done by it, provided it be of such a nature
as is likely to arise from such an animal, and the owner knows it.
Thus in the case of a dog, if he bites a man or worries sheep, and
his owner knows he is accustomed to bite men or to worry sheep,
the owner is responsible; but the party injured has no remedy
unless the soienter can be proved. This is very familiar doctrine.
The owner of a horse must be taken to know that a horse will
stray if not properly secured, and may find its way into its neighbor's corn or pasture. For a trespass of that kind the owner is
of course responsible. But if a horse does something which his
owner has no reason to expeethim to do, he has the same sortof
protection that the owner of a dog has."
In Jac7son v. 9mithson, 15 Mees. & W. 563, where a ram
butted the plaintifi's wife in the street, the Court of Exchequer
refused to hold the owner of the animal liable, in the absence of
evidence that he was aware of its propensity to attack passers by.
In Hudson v. _oberts, 6 Exch. 697, POLLOCK, C. B., said thabt
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there must be some evidence of seienter to sustain an action for
injury done by a bull while being driven along the highway.
The case of Angus v. Badin, 2 South. 816, holds the owner
of cattle to a stricter accountability for damages done by them
than the English cases establish. In that case the defendant's
oxen broke the plaintiff's close and killed his cow; and the owner
of the oxen was held liable, without proving the scienter, on the
ground that he was responsible for the entire injury committed
by his cattle while trespassing upon the plaintiff's premises.
Coxe v. Robbins, 4 Halst. Law, 477, requires every man, at his
peril, to keep his cattle on his own close and makes him answerable for any injury they may do by straying without his knowledge upon the lands of another.
But I have found no case where the owner of a dog has been
held in an action of trespass where his dog went upon the premises of another without his consent.
Bec7cwilh v. Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092, was placed upon the express ground that the defendant was himself a trespasser with his
dog in the plaintiff's close at the time the damage was done; so
that the jury had a right to find that the act of the dog was the
voluntary trespass of the master.
Cooley on Torts, p. 34, draws a distinction between dogs and
beasts which subsist on grass and grain. If the latter break into
inclosures, they may do serious mischief; and therefore if not restrained by the owner, he must respond for the damages that
ensue.
No action has been maintained in this state against the owner
of a dog, for killing sheep upon the land of another, unless the
scienter was shown.
Mr. Chitty in his first volume on Pleading, p. 182, says that
the owner of a dog is not liable unless he has notice of his vicious
propensity; but if the animal were naturally of the propensity to
do the mischief complained of, as horses and cattle to trespass on
land, the owner is liable without alleging the scienter. The
forms of pleading in the books of precedents are all in accordance with this text.
The practice of permitting dogs to run at large in our streets
and highways has so long and so universally prevailed without
holding the owner liable for any injury, which he had no reason
to believe they would commit, that it would justly create great
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surprise to maintain such a cause of action now. In my opinion
the action will not lie, without proof of the scienter.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
On account of engagements in the Circuit Mr. Justice PXRKER
took no part in the decision of this case.
In general to make the owner or
keeper of domestic animals liable in
damages for personal injuries committed by them, it must be shown that
he knew of their vicious propensities. This general proposition is so
well established and known, that a citation of authorities to support it is
unnecessary. But in view of the legal complications which frequently
arise in actions of this nature, and
the seeming discord springing from
the practical application of this principle, it will be interesting to present
a review of the authorities, and the
reasons upon which the rule is
founded.
The rule excepting owners and
keepers of domestic animals from
liability for injuries committed by
such animals rests upon reasonable
ground. Being of a tame nature, not
given to do harm, it is unreasonable
to suppose that under ordinary circumstances they would commit
vicious acts; whereas, in the case
of wild animals, whose nature to do
mischief is well known, the law presumes this knowledge on the part of
the owner or keeper. In both cases
this knowledge is the same in substance and works the same results.
In the former it must be established
by evidence, while in the latter it is
presumed: Laverone v. 1fangianti, 41
Cal. 138; s. c., 10 Am. Rep. 269;
Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 654, and
cases.
The liability does not depend upon
the classification of the animal doing
the injury, but upon its propensity to

do mischief. Per SHEDOx, J., in
.Earlv. Alstine, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 635.
Thus, if a person chooses to keep a
domestic animal, as a dog, which is
naturally savage and dangerous, he
does so at his peril, and would be
liable for any injury done by such
dog without evidence that he has ever
done mischief before.
Id.: see
Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark 227; Hartley
v. Harriman, 1 Barn. & Ald. 620.
"The action rests upon the negligence of the owner in keeping an
animal which is likely to prove injurious and hurtful. The scenter isthe
gist of the action :" Koney v. Ward,
36 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 256 ; Rewes v.
.McNamara,106 Mass. 281; Besozi v.
Harris, 1 Fost. & Fin. 92. Where
the owner of a horse suffered it to go
at large in the streets of a populous
city, he is liable to a person kicked
by it, without proof that the owner
knew that the horse was vicious, for
the reason that the owner is presumed
to know the natural disposition of a
horse to gambol, plunge, and kick up
his heels, and the consequent danger to persons on the streefs: Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. St. 193; see
Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W.&S. 369; Paff
v. Slack,7 Barr 254. But it is not negligence to let a horse run on a highway without notice of itsviciouspropensities, the rule being the same as
applied to dogs: Holden v. Shattuek,
34 Vt. 336; Cox v. .Burbridge, 13 C.
B. (N. S.) 430; s. c., 11 W. R. 435.
It is, however, negligence to let a
stallion in a public highway: MeiIlvaine v. Lantz, 100 Pa. St. 586; s.
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c., 45 Am. Rep. 400. Yet, where a
horse is rightfully kept and strays
upon the highway, the owner is not
liable unless negligence is shown:
Fallon y. O'Brien, 12 R I. 518, approving Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. St.
188, and Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y.
400.
A distinction between horses and
dogs was attempted to be established
in Mason v. Keding, 1 Ld. Raym.
606, where the action failed because
it was not shown that defendant knew
that his dog was valdeferox. "For
there is a great difference," says the
court, "between horses and oxen, in
which a man has a valuable property,
and which are not so familiar to mankind, and dogs; the former, the
owner ought to confine and take all
reasonable caution that they do no
mischief, otherwise an action will lie
against him; but otherwise of dogs,
before he has notice of some mischievous qualities?' Concerning this,
WrLLAkmS, J., in Coz v. Burbridge, 13
C. B. (N. S.) 439, said, "I cannot see
what difference it can make whether
the animal is or is not one in which a
man may have a valuable property"
As to 'Vature of Knowledge of Vieiousness.-It has been held that notice
which will charge the owner or keeper with liability must be notice that
the animal was inclined to do the
particularmischief of which complaint
is made. Thus, notice that a dog is
ferociously disposed toward cattle is
not notice that he will attack persons. And it is not necessary that
the owner should see his dog attack
mankind, but the vicious propensity
must have in some way have been
brought to his knowledge, "so as to
admonish him to take the necessary
precaution to prevent injury in the
future:" Twigg v. .Ryland, 62 Md.
380. So it is said that knowledge of
the owner that his dog has attacked

animals of one class is not evidence
from which knowledge may be inferred that it would attack animals
of another and different class, nor
that it would attack mankind: Wood
on Nuisances, 803; Keightlinger v.
Egan, 65 Ill. 235, 247. " But it is
not necessary that the aggression
brought to the notice of the owner
should be precisely similar to that
on which the action against him is
founded, but they should indicate a
disposition to commit injury substantially like those which form the basis
of the cause of action:" Shearman &
Redf. on Neg., approved in Mann v.
See
Weiand, 81 star Pa. St. 243.
Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio (N. Y.)
500, 501. If there is within the
owner's knowledge reasonable grounds
to suppose that the dog may commit
injury, he must restrain him or be
liable for the consequences: Mlansburg v. Basin, 3 Bradw. (Ill. App.)
531, and cases on p. 539. As to the
reasons of this rule, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, in a very
recent case, says, that if it were necessary that the prior "vicious acts
should be precisely similar" to that
upon which the action is founded
"there would be no actionable redress
for the first injury of a particular kind
committed by such an animal, because
its owner would necessarily be exempt
from all liability until it should commit another injury of exactly the
same kind. It is enough to say that
the law sanctions no such absurdity :"
Reynolds v. Hrussey (N. H1.), 5 Atl.
Rep. 458; s.c., 22 Rep. 563; s.c., 2
New England Rep. 722. Hence, it
has been held that it is unnecessary
that the owner have notice of a previous injury to others. "It is the
propensity to commit the mischief that
constitutes the danger, and therefore
it is sufficient if the owner has seen
or heard enough to convince a man
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of ordinary prudence of the animal's
inclination to commit the class of
injuriescomplained of. * * * The
question in each case is whether the
notice was sufficient to put the owner
on his guard, and to require him, as
an ordinarily prudent man, to anticipate the injury which has actually
occurred. Hence, it is unnecessary
to prove more than that he has good
cause of supposing that the animal
may so conduct itself:" Reynolds v.
Husey, supra. Thus, where the
owner knows his dog to be ferocious,
lie is liable for injury to one on his
premises innocently, without notice of
the dog's character. The fact thatthis
is the dog's first attack on persons
does not excuse the owner: Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54; s. c., 22 Am.
Rep. 600. "The law has gone far to
shield those who have kept dogs for
the protection of their property from
the consequences of injuries to persons inflicted by them, but not so far
as to protect the keepers of such asare
known to them to be ferocious to a degree that endangers the safety of such
as are unwarned and innocently upon
the premises from the consequences
of wounds inflicted by them el Id.
So, where the owner knows that his
dog follows his team and watches it
when hitched, and is accustomed to
attack and bite strangers approaching
the team, he is liable to one bitten by
such dog, who lawfully attempts to
remove such team: Fairchildv..Bentley, 30 Barb. 147. And, under such
circumstances, he is also liable, for
injury to a seven-year-old child, although the child was meddling with
a whip in the sleigh: 3feibus v. Dodge,
38 Wis. 300.
In Keighlinger v. Egan, 65 Ill. 141,
the biting occurred at a neighbor's
house where the dog had followed
oneof defendant's family. Theplaintiff was under the impression that

the dog belonged about the house
and was about to pat it on the head
when it sprang up and bit him in the
face. Defendant knew that the dog
was vicious and was held liable. See
.Marsh v. Jones, 21 Vt. 378.
Proof of Viciousness.-In case of domestic animals the burden of proof
of knowledge of viciousness is upon
plaintiff, but otherwise as to animals
of a wild nature: TwMigg v. Byland,
62 Md. 380; s. c., 24 Am. L. Reg. 181,
note, 195; s. c., 50 Am. Rep. 226,
note, 229. As to the extent of proof
required to show that a dog is used
to injure people, a mere habit of
bounding upon and seizing persons
in play, not so as to hurt or injure
them, though causing some annoyance and trivial accidental damage to
clothes, will not sustain the action,
but "It is not necessary to show that
he was used to bite if he was used to
injure people." Per ERtLE, C. J., in
Line v. Taylor, 3 Foster & Fin. 731.
The dog may be brought into court
and shown to the jury to assist them
in judging of his temper and disposition. In the last cited case, the dog
was brought into court and led by his
keeper with a chain. "Thejury had
him brought up to them," so runs the
report, "and attheir desire the keeper
let go of him. They examined him,
and appeared to be of opinion that,
from the expression of his eye and
other indications, he was hot of a
vicious disposition.'
Any evidence tending to establish
the ferocious and vicious propensity
of the animal, known to the owner,
is properly submitted to the jury.
"That a dog has once bitten a man,
is a circumstance from which the
probability of its biting another may
be inferred; but the same inference
may be drawn with equal confidence
from other indications of the dog's
disposition:" .fMcCaskill v. Elliot, 5
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Strob. 196. Proof that defendant has
warned a person to beware of the
dog lest he should be bitten, is evidence to go to the jury of the allegation that the dog was accustomed to
bite mankind: Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark
235. In charging the jury, ABBOrT,
J., said: "In order to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, you must be
satisfied that the dog had before the
time of the injury bitten some human
being and that defendant knew it."
But this expression is contrary to
the weight of authority, as will be
seen hereafter.
The fact that the dog was fierce
and ferocious, and that he was kept
chained and muzzled by his keeper,
are "strong evidence" that the dog
was known to be vicious: Goodeau
v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251; s. c., 36 Am.
Rep. 751.
In Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio
(N. Y.) 500, 501, the owner knew
that his dog was accustomed to do
similar mischief. He kept the dog
confined in the daytime, and at night
kept him in his store. reld, to be
strong evidence that the owner was
fully aware that the safety of his
neighbors would be endangered by
allowing the dog to be at large.
Knowledge of the dangerous character of watch-dogs may be inferred
from the owners' habit of tying them
by day: Goodev. Martin, 57 Md. 606
s.c., 40 Am. Rep. 448. See 1 Thomps.
on Neg. p. 203, 17, and cases; .Montgomery v. Koester, 35 La. Ann. 1091;
s.c., 48 Am. Rep. 253. Full and satisfactory proof of a single instance of
biting mankind and knowledge on
the part of the owner or keeper will
sustain the action: Arnold v. Norton,
25 Conn. 92. The gist of the action
for the subsequent misconduct of the
dog is for keeping it after knowledge
of its vicious propensity: Mann v.
Weiand, 81 star Pa. St.243; see Wheeler

v. Brant, 23 Barb. 324; Wood on
Nuisance, 763; Jones v. Perry,2 Esp.
482; Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332;
Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109;
Smith v. Black, 1 Sw. Digest 537;
KiUredgev.Elliott, 16 I.H. 77; Loomis
v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496. One attempt
of a bull to gore is sufficient: Cockerham v. .ixon, 11 Ired. 269. In Smith
v. Pelah, 2 Str. 1264, it was ruled
(per LEE, C. J.) "that if a dog has
once bitten a man, and the owner,
having notice thereof, keeps the dog,
and lets him go about and lie at his
door, an action will lie against him
at the suit of a person who is bit,
though it happened by such person's
treading on the dog's toes; for it was
owing to his not hanging the dog on
the first notice. And the safety of
the king's subjects ought not afterwards to be endangered."
But if the proof is sufficient to show
that the owner knew the dog was
fierce and ferocious, it is unnecessary
to prove that he had ever bitten mankind. "The formula used in the textbooks, and the forms given for pleadings in such cases, 'accustomed to
bite,' does not mean that the keeper
of a ferocious dog is exempt from all
duty of restraint until the dog has effectually mangled and killed at least
one person. * * If he had good reason
tobelieve, from his knowledge of the
ferocious nature and propensity of the
dog, that there was ground to apprehend that he would, under some circumstances, bite a person, then the
duty of restraint attaches, and to omit
it was negligence :" Goodeauv.Blood,
52 Vt. 251; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 751.
See to same effect Shearman &Redfield
on Neg. 231, 234; Buckley v. Leonard,
4 Denio (N. Y.) 500; Bider v. White,
65 N. Y.; s. c., 22 Am Rep. 600;
Worth v. Giding, L. R. 2 0. P. 1.
In Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697,
a bull was being driven along the
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Steam Yav. Co., 33 T. J.(Q. B.) 319,
where a similar question arose, the
Lord Chief Justice said that notice of
the vicious propensity of the dog given
to the porters or servants employed
about the premises would not suffice;
but that if brought home to the person who had the general management
of the yard, in which the defendants
themselves could not be supposed to
be acting, and who had authority to
say whether a dog should be kept
Serran's.Knowledge.-1Knowledge of there or not, or whether it should be
aservant, who has charge of the ani- chained up or not, it would be othermal, of its vicious propensities, is the wise.
master's knowledge: Baldwin v. CasIn Applebiee v. Percy, 6 L. R.
ella,L. R. 7 Ex. 325; Stiles v. Steam (C.P.) 649 ; s. c., 10 Eng. R. 334,
Kay. Co., 33 T. J. (Q. B.) 310 ; Carliss two persons who had upon previous
v. Smith, 53 Vt. 532. Notice of a occasions (one of them twice) been
dog's vicious propensities given to de- attacked by the dog in question were
fendant's wife, who attended to her called to prove that they had gone to
husband's business in his absence, for defendant's public house and made
the purpose of being communicated to complaint to two persons who were
the husband, was held to be some evi- behind the bar serving customers, and
dence of a scienter, to be considered by that one of them had also complained
the jury: Gladman v. Johnson, 36 T. to the bar maid. There was no eviJ. (C.P.) 153. BovmL, C. J., said: dence that complaint was communi"I am not prepared to assent to the cated to defendant, nor that the two
proposition that notice to an ordinary men spoken to had the general manservant, or even to a wife, would in agement of defendant's business, or
all cases be sufficient to fix defendant had care of the dog. Hded, by Lord
in such an action as this, with knowl- CoL=.n=GE, C. J., and KEATn,TG, J.
edge of the mischievous propensities (BRETT, J., dissenting) that there was
of the dog. But here it appears that evidence of scienter to go to the jury,
the wife attended to the milk busi- relying upon Gladman v. Johnson,
ness, which was carried on upon the supra. In Twigg v. .Ryland, 62 Md.
premises where the dog was kept, and 380 ; s. c., 24 Am. T. Reg. 191 ; s. c.,
that a formal complaint as to that dog 50 Am. Rep. 226, it is held that a
was made to the wife when on the servant's knowledge, etc., of a dog
premises, and for the purpose of be- accustomed to follow him about in
ing communicated to the husband. It the master's business but not put in
may be that this isbut slight evidence his charge by the master is not imof the scienter but the only question putable to the master. In giving the
is whether it is evidence of it. I think opinion, the court said: "It is very
true, as shown by the authorities, that
it is.'
This case was referred to and com- if the owner of a dog place it in the
mented upon in Goode v. Martin, 57 charge and keeping of a servant, the
servant's knowledge of the dog's
Md. 610, 611 ; s. c., 40 Am. Rep. 448;
and in the case of Stiles v. Cardiff ferocious disposition is the knowledge
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highway, while plaintiff, who wore a
red handkerchief, was passing along
the same road. The red irritated the
animal, and caused plaintiff to be
gored by it. After the injury the
owner of the bull said that the red
handkerchief caused the injury, as he
knew that the bull would run at anything red; and on a different occasion
he said that he knew a bull would
run at anything red. Held, thistobe
sufficient evidence of the scienter.
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of the master. But it is not true
that the knowledge of any servant
that a dog may follow or be with
about the premises where he is employed as to the disposition of the
dog, is to be imputed to the master.
This is clear upon all the authorities."
Liability Under Statute.-In case of
injury to sheep, under the English
statutes, proof of the scienter is unnecessary: 26 & 27 Vict., c. 60; 28 & 29,
e. 100. And under the statutes of some
of the states of thetUnion it is unnecessary to aver and prove the scienter to
recover for injuries inflicted by dogs:
Zertschacke v. Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430;
Orney v. .oberts, 51 N. H. 110; Swift
v. Applebone, 23 Mich. 252; Pressey v.
Worth, 3 Allen (Mass.) 19; Gries v.
Zeck,!24 Ohio St. 329; Woolfv. Chalker,
31 Conn. 132. While knowledge is
unnecessary to sustain the action, yet
it is an important element in determining the damages: Swift v. Applebone4, 23 Mich. 252. And the judgment will not be arrested because the
declaration does not set forth that the
acts were done contrary to the form
of the statute: Mitchell v. Clapp, 12
Cush. (Mass.) 278. The right under
the statute does not supersede the

common-law action. The plaintiff
must distinctly aver that the injury
was caused by the dog and set it forth
as a cause of action. In Monroe v.
Rose, 38 Mich. 347, plaintiff was riding in a sulkey, leading a colt with
one hand and driving with the other.
Defendant's dog ran out and bit the
colt, which jumped forward, put one
foot through the wheel of the sulkey
and overturned it, and injured the
colt, sulkey, and plaintiff. The petition alleged that the dog "bit the
colt," but there was no averment that
he assaulted or bit plaintiff, or that
he "otherwise injured him" him;
held, that evidence of injury to plaintiffwas inadmissible. See Searles v.
Ladd,123 Mass. 580.
In LeForest v. Tolman, 117 Mass.
109, the dog bit plaintiff in New
Hampshire, but was owned by defendant, who resided and kept his dog in
Massachusetts. There was no evidence of knowledge, etc., on part of
defendant, nor was it contended that
there was liability under the laws of
New Hampshire ; held, that under
General Statutes of Mass., c. 88, 59,
the action would not lie.
EUGENE McQuMLIX.
St. Louis, Mo.

Sup1reme Court of Pennsylvania.
BLUM v. ROSS.
Where an insolvent opened a store, and carried on business in the anme of
his wife, who signed, for goods purchased, certain notes subsequently paid with
the proceeds of the business, but was not further known in the business, held,
that the obvious use of the wife's name was for the purpose of defraudingcreditors, and there was no error in the court below refusing to submit the case to
a jury.

ERROR to Court of Common Pleas of Bradford county.
Feigned issue, by Daniel Blum against Lewis P. Ross, to determine the ownership of property taken in execution as the property of Joseph C. Blumn. The said Joseph C. Blum failed in the
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shoe business in Akron, Ohio, and his stock was purchased at
sheriff's sale by his sister-in-law. In the following year he
moved to Towanda, Pennsylvania, with his wife, who owned a
house and lot there, previously given to her by Blum. The
stock was purchased from his sister-in-law for $1,500, payable
in three notes of $500 each, signed by Ida E. Blum. These
notes were paid, at maturity, out of the proceeds of the store.
Ida E. Blum testified that she knew nothing about the business,
which was conducted by her husband, who was her agent. March
31, 1883, she presented her petition for a certificate entitling her
to her separate earnings, under the Act of April 3, 1872, and a
decree was so entered. September 20, 1884, Lewis P. Ross obtained judgment against Joseph C. Blum, and, in January, 1885,
issued thereon aft.fa., under which the said stock was levied
upon. The goods were claimed by Daniel Blum, by virtue of a
sale by Ida E. Blum to him, January 26,1885, for $2,700. The
court instructed the jury to find for defendant. Verdict and
judgment accordingly, whereupon plaintiff took this writ.
N. C. Elsbree, E. Elsbree, and HT. Il Williams, for plaintiff in
error.
S. . Lit.e, Win. Lite, and H. .TJradUill, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Were we to reverse the judgment of the court
below, we must needs make bad work with the law heretofore
governing the marital relation; for not only, in that event, would
we have to allow the wife to acquire and hold property on her
personal credit, but also to have and own, even as against creditors, the labor and earnings of her husband. A very brief statement of the facts of the case will, we think, demonstrate that the
action of the Common Pleas was correct, and that the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff was not of such a character as required
its submission to the jury. In the first place, when the goods in
controversy were bought, Joseph C. Blum, the husband of Ida
E. Blum, who was the vendor of the plaintiff, was insolvent.
This insolvent husband bought these goods, as she alleges, as her
agent, though, so far as the evidence is concerned, it does not appear that he had any previous authority so to act. She testifies
that she did not know where the bargain was made; whether the
GORDOn,
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agreement was in writing or not, and if it were in writing.she
had not seen it. Nor was she consulted about the notes which
were given for the goods, and had, indeed, nothing to do with
the transaction but to sign those notes when they were presented
to her for that purpose. Neither had she anything to do with
the sale of the goods after the store was opened in her name, for
that business was also conducted by her husband as her agent.
So the notes were paid, not from any money or property advanced by her, but from the proceeds of the business. It thus
appears that she had nothing in the transaction but her signature.
Under such circumstances, it is clear that her application for the
benefit of the Act of the 3d of April, 1872, has nothing to do
with the case, for the effort here is not to protect her separate
earnings from the grasp of his creditors, for she had no such
earnings, but rather to appropriate his earnings to her own use,
and thus prevent their application to his debts. To sanction an
effort of this kind would be to extend the rights of married
women much further than has as yet been done by this court. It
is said, however, that she owned some property in her own right,
and that this might be regarded as a foundation for her credit.
It is true she owned a house and lot, but it is nowhere intimated
that she obtained the goods on the credit of that estate. She
asked for no such credit, nor does it appear that her alleged vendor so much as knew that she had an estate of any kind. If
there is one thing settled in relation to this subject, it is that,
while a married woman may buy goods on credit, yet, as was
said Mr. Justice MERCUR, in Seeds v. Kahler,76 Pa. 263, it must
be on the credit of her separate estate, and, as against the creditors of her husband, she must affirmatively establish that fact.
We agree that, where afeme covert owns property of value sufficient to serve as the foundation of a credit, direct proof that the
credit was based upon it may not be necessary, for the jury may
infer that fact from the circumstances surrounding the transaction: Spering v. Laughlin, 113 Pa. St. 209. But in the case
before us there are no circumstances which would fairly warrant
such an inference. Personally, as we have said, beyond the signing of the notes, she was not known in the business. The whole
matter was conducted by her husband, and without the slightest
reference to her separate estate; and that her name was used

BLUM v. ROSS.

merely as a cloak to cover the property from the claims of creditors is, from the evidence, so obvious that it cannot be overlooked or ignored.
We cannot, therefore, convict the court below of error in refusing to submit to the jury a case so wholly unsupported by
facts.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this case, the questions of
general interest are, can a married
woman purchase on personal credit,
goods and merchandise, to start
in business? Can her insolvent
husband carry on the business in
her name, pay for the goods so purchased out of the proceeds of the
business, and have his personal earnings in such businessexempt from his
creditors ?
At common law a married woman
could purchase on her personal
credit, subject, however, to the right
of her husband to divest her of the
title; meaning that although she
could not make a valid contract, yet, if
the purchase was made, and the title
vested in the wife, the common law
proprio vigore would not, if the hus-

band did not, disturb the purchase:
Kelly Cont. M. IV. 118; 4 Cruise
Dig. 25.
Under the equity doctrine a married woman could own and possess
a separate estate, and had power,
when possessed therewith, to contract
with respect thereto, and bind that
estate to pay for other property,
which would also become separate
estate: Kelly Cont. M. W., ch. 8.
The enabling statutes converted this
equity doctrine into statutory law
and in many states went much farther: Johnson v. Tones, 12 B. Mon.

326; Bal!in v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 3.5;
.WmncVldyv.Smith, 51 N. Y. 21 ; Brown
v. Pendleton, 10 P. L. Sm. (Pa.) 419.
Under these statutes the adjudications

are very conflicting upon the question, whether or not a married
woman, not possessed with a separate
estate, can purchase on her personal
credit: Lanier v. Boss, 1 Dev. &
Bat. Eq. 39; Dunningv. Pike, 46 Me.
461; Carpeter v. Mitchell, 40111.470;
Johnston v. Houston, 47 Mo. 227;
Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277;
Shields v. Keys, 24 Iowa 298; Ratcliff
v. Collins, 35 Miss. 581; Parerfildv.
Butler, 47 Miss. 165.
The following cases hold the affirmative of this question: Abbey v.
Deyo, 44 Barb. 379; Williamson v.
Dodge, 5 Hun. 498; Allen v. Fuller,
118 Mass. 402; Spalding v. Day, 10
Allen 98 ; Larabee v. Dolly, 99 Mass.
559; Bugbee v. Blood, 48 Vt. 500;
Trieberv. Stover, 30 Ark. 729 ; Knapp
v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 279; Shields v.
Keys, 24 Iowa 313; 3fitchel v. Smith,
32 Iowa 486; Pemberton v. Johnson,
46 Mo. 342; Stewart v. Jenkins, 6 Allen 300; Brown v. Herman, 14 Abb.
Pr. 394; Freeing v. Rolland, 53 N.
Y. 425; Fisk v. Wright, 47 3o. 352;
Elder v. Cordray, 54 Ill. 244; Pringle
v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 468; Huyler v. Atwood, 11 C. E. Green 506; Donavan's
Appeal, 41 Conn. 555; Chamberland
v. obertson, 31 Iowa 408. But in
Pennsylvania it is held that a married
woman cannot purchase on her personal credit: Bucher v. Ream, 18 Pa.
421; Hallowell v. Harter, 11 Casey
375, but see Pattersonv. Robinson, 25
Pa. St. 82; Curney v. Batt, 53 Pa. St.
403 ; ffanderbach v. Mock, 5 Casey 43.

BLUM v. ROSS.
Notwithstanding the enabling act in
this state, as in other states, provides
that all property acquired by a married woman during coverture by will,
descent, deed of conveyance, or otherwise shall be her separate estate. The
same rule was held in Maine: Dunning v. Pike, 46 Me. 463; and in Miss:ssippi : Doyle v. Orr, 51 Miss. 232;
Whitworth v. Carter,43 Miss. 72; and
in Indiana: Light v. Lane, 41 Ind.
542; Kyger v. Skirt Co., 34 Ind. 249;
but see Johnson v. Chissom, 14 Ind.
416; Howjh v. .lythes .E'rs.,20 Ind.
24, and in Kentucky: Bobinson v.
Trustee, 11 Bush 179; and in North
Carolina: Atkinson v. Richardson, 74
N. C. 458; and formerly in Iowa:
Jimes v. Crosthwait, 17 Iowa 402; and
in Illinois: Carpenter v. Mitchell, 50
Ill. 472; and in New Hampshire:
Ames v. Foster, 42 N. H.3810; and
in Arkansas: 'tidmanv. Matthews, 29
Ark. 658; Wood v. Terry, 30 Ark.
391; and in Alabama: Wilkinson v.
Cheatham, 45 Ala. 342.
It was held in Pennsylvania that a
married woman could give her judgment bond for the purchase-money,
or any part thereof, so as to charge
the land purchased, and it would be
valid: Pattersonv. Robinson, 25 Pa.
St. 81; Brunner's Appeal, 11 Wr. 67;
ahmborger v. Ingrahm, 2 Id. 146;
Peacock v. Fly, 2 B. 542; Sawte//e's
Appeal, 34 Leg. Int.349, on the ground
that at common law she could be a
grantee, and if the husband did not
disagree, the purchase would be good:
Baxter v. Smith, 6 Binn. 427; 4 Cruise
Dig. 25; she had capacity to purchase: Walker v. Coover, 15 P. F.
Smith 430; Cowton v. Wickersham, 4
P. F. S. 302; Winch v. James, 18 Id.
297; Bortzv. BorIz, 12 Wr. 382; Vance
v. Nagle, 20 P. F. S. 176. And she
could also receive the verbal assignment of bonds as collateral security:
Walker v. QoVer, supra; or a lease

for a term of years: Baxter v. Smith,
supra.
The statute does not abrogate this
common-law capacity, but, on the contrary, seems to concede or admit it, by
using the words or otherwise in designating the means by which a separate
estate may be acquired. If, therefore, a married woman could purchase
on her personal credit before the
statute, and there is no express prohibition in the statute, why is it that
she cannot do so after the enactment
of that statute? That statute does not
in express terms interfere with the
common-law doctrine. The courts
made the interference. The conclusion seems correct that, as she had the
power before the statute, and the
statute did not expressly interfere
with that power, she still retains it.
But the Pennsylvania courts have
held otherwise, and it is presumed
that, following the illogic of colonial
times, the courts of this state construed the words "or otherwise" contained in the enabling statutes to refer to the preceding terms "will,"
"descent," and " conveyance," on the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, and did
not allow these two words to enlarge
the scope and operation of the act, as
was the intention of the legislature.
The intention of the legislature was
to protect the property of a married
woman, no matter how acquired, if
no fraud or injury ensued in the acquirement. Early in its period this
court, like some other courts, adopted,
in the construction of these statutes,
the American doctrine first advanced
in South Carolina and subsequently
expounded by Chancellor KET,
namely, that a married woman has
no power over her separate estate
but such as is given by the instrument creating it, and she cannot therefore charge the estate with her debts
or contracts unless the instrument ex-
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pressly permit it. Kelly, Cont.M. W.
258, 491. That it was the separate
estate and not her humanity which
created her power to contract; that
she had no capacity without such estate, and could only acquire it in the
way pointed out by the statute, and
not by personal credit.
The next question is the right of the
husband's creditors to reach the fruits
of his services in the management,
conduct of, or concerning her separate business or property.
The court in the principal case
held the negative on this question, on
the ground, as stated in the opinion,
that " the whole matter was conducted by her husband, and without
the slightest reference to her separate estate; and that her name was
used (in the business) merely as a
cloak to cover the property from the
claims of creditors." It is, in the
principal case, a fact that at the time
of the purchase of the goods, and the
giving of her notes therefor, she was
possessed of a separate estate, and the
case of Spering v. Laughlin, 113 Pa.
St. 209, holds that when this fact
exists, direct proof that the credit
was based upon the separate estate is
not necessary. The following cases
hold that if the wife is possessed of a
separate estate she can purchase on
her personal credit, and the property
so acquired will be protected from the
claims of her husband's creditors:
Browvn v. Pendleton, 10 P. F. S. 419;
Silven Ex. v. Porter, 24 Id. 448;
Wieman v. Anderson, 6 Wr. 311; Kepler v. Davis, 30 P. F. S. 153; Bucher
v. Beam, 18 Id. 421; Bush v. Vought,
5 Id. 437; even if the thing purchased
be merchandise, to be used in trade:
Wiemam v. Anderson, supra; Welch v.
KMine, 7 P. F. S. 428; or other property: Conrad v. Shome, 8 Wr. 193;
and the products and fruits of the
same be obtained through and by the
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assistance, in whole or in part, of the
husband: Musserv. Gardner,16 P. F.
S. 242. if this is a correct conclusion
from those cases, then the conclusion
in the principal case is erroneous.
And, on the other hand, if these cases,
and the current of the decisions in
this state follow the American doctrine as above stated, then the principal case is in accord with previous
adjudications, and the rule is that a
married woman can only contract
with respect to and upon the faith
and credit of her separate estate:
Kelly, Cont. M. IV. 490.
If the American rule prevails, and
a married woman cannot purchase a
stock of goods on credit, then the
other question whether or not her
husband can devote his services to
her business exempt from his creditors cannot cut any figure, because the
purchase would be his purchase, as at
common law, and hence subject to
And, on the other
his creditors.
hand, if she can purchase, or if there
is no question about the purchase,
then the other question arises. On
estabthis the weight of authori
lishes the rule that creditors of the
husband have no power to reach the
fruits of his services bestowed by
him gratuitously in good faith for
his wife in the management of, or
concerning her separate business or
property, and cannot acquire any
rights against the wife or her property or her business on account of
such services, nor reach, any part of
his earnings from such labor given to
his wife before the same becomes
vested in him: Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N.
Y. 343; Buckley v. Wdls, 33 N. Y.
518; Wartman v. Price, 47 Il. 22;
Glidden v. Taylor, 16 0. S. T. 509;
iational Bank v. Sprague, 5 C. E.
Green 13; O'Leary v. Walter,10 Abb.
Pr. 439; Webster v. Hildreth, 33
Vt. 457; White v. .ildreh, 32 Vt.
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265; Goss v. ahill, 42 Barb. 310;
Fiske v. Bailey, 51 N. Y. 150; see
Feller v. Alden, 23 Wis. 301. On the
principle that a creditor has no power
to reach, direct, or control the future
labors or contracts relating to the
future of his debtor, but only that
which his debtor actually acquires:
Webster v. "Hildreth,supra; Fis7ke v.
Bailey, supra, and the further ground
that a wife (nor any one) cannot be
compelled to pay for labor or services
which the husband or laborer agreed
should not be paid for. But _Pcnn v.
Whiehead 12 Gratt. 74; Wilson v.
Loomis, 55 Ill. 352, and the Pennsylvania cases (see Bucher v. BReam,
supra) held that a husband has no
power or right to devote his labor or
skill to the exclusive use of his wife
in her separate business or separate
estate, but that all acquisitions on account of the husband's labor must be
appropriated to pay his creditors.
While some of the cases do not positively hold the doctrine that the
creditors of the husband cannot touch
the acquisition or fruits of his '_abor,
skill, etc., gratuitously bestowed in
his wife's business or business conducted in her name, the conclusion
that his creditors cannot touch such
acquisitions is inevitable from the
reasons given in those cases: RanUn
v. West, 25 Mich. 195; Tillman v.
Sackdleton, 15 Id. 447; Duncan v.
osselle, 15 Iowa 501; MtcheIl v. Saw.yer, 21 Id. 582; Burger v. White, 2
Bosw. 92; Dean v. Bailey, 50 Ill. 481;
Elder v. (Jordray, 54 Id. 244; Bridgeford v. Biddell, 55 Id. 261; Bank v.
sSprague, 5 Green 13 ; Skillman v. SLkillman, 2 Beas. 403; ,Tohson v. Vail, 1
McCarter 423. And this rule applies no matter if the husband is
insolvent or a bankrupt: O'Leary v.
Walter, 10 Abb. Pr. 446; Abby v.
Deyo, 44 Barb. 380; Bucley v. Wells,
33 N. Y. 520; Gage v. Dauchey, 34

N. Y. 297; Cooper v. Ham, 49 Ind.
394.
The cases of Spring v. Laughlin,
113 Pa. St. 213, and Leeds v. Kaher,
76 Pa. St. 262, affirmatively assert the
doctrine that a husband can give to
his wife his labor and skill in conducting her business, and his creditors
cannot touch the fruits or product of
that labor and skill so produced, and
the cases of Welch v. Kline, 57 Pa. St.
428, and Handerbachv. .oba,
29 Pa.
St. 45, and Weiman v. Anderson, 6 Wr.
311, are in conflict in principle with
the case to which this is a note, and,
indeed, are in harmony with the cases
above given as adverse to the ruling
in this case.
It remains to be stated that the
Pennsylvania statute is not different,
as to the questions involved, from the
statutes of the states where the adverse decisions have been made: Kelly,
Cont. M. W. ch. 9, et seq.
The questions involved in the principal case are very learnedly discussed
in American Law IRegister, 1885, pp.
130, 353, 470
J o. F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.
Since the decision of the above
case a new married woman's act has
been passed by the legislature of
Pennsylvania, the first section of
which provides that marriage "shall
not be held to impose any disability
on or incapacity in a married woman
as to the acquisition, ownership, possession,.control, use or disposition of
property of any kind in any trade or
business in which she may engage"
* ** Provided, however, "a married
woman shall have no power to mortgage or convey her real estate unless
her husband join in such mortgage
or conveyance;" and by the second
section, "a married woman shall be
capable of entering into and rendering herself liable upon any contract
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relating to any trade or business in
which she may engage, or for necessaries * * * in all respects as if she
were afeme sole * * * provided, however, that nothing in this or the pre-

ceding section shall enable a married
woman to become accommodation endorser, guarantee, or surety for another." Act June3, 1887, P.L. 3s2.
ED.

8uprene Court of Tennessee.
CARVER GIN AND MACHINE CO. v. BANNON.
A partnership may convey all its assets in payment of an individual creditor of one of the members of the firm, even conveying it in trust for that purpose, if there is no fraudulent intent in fact.
It is only through the lien a partner has on the partnership assets that the
firm creditors may secure a preference in the firm assets over the individual
creditors; but if the partner has destroyed or parted with that lien the right
of the firm creditors is lost.

APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Shelby county.

Win. 231. Rndo~ph, for complainant.
Gautt & Pattersonand IR.C. Wariiner, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CALDWELL, J.-Under the firm name and style ofF. J. Bannon & Co., Albert Paine and F. J. Bannon were partners in
the ownership and operation of a cotton-gin in the city of Memphis. In the course of the business, for partnership purposes
and in the name of the firm, they contracted certain debts with
the Carver Gin and Machine Company, evidenced by several acceptances. Subsequently Albert Paine, F. J. Bannon, and Margaret Bannon, in their individual names, executed their joint
notes to Mr. Gavin for $750 each, and on the same day Paine
and Bannon conveyed their partnership property in trust to Sullivan to secure the judgment of [or] the two notes to Gavin.
Some ten months thereafter the Carver Gin and Machine Company filed this bill to set aside the trust conveyance as a fraud
upon the partnership creditors, and to subject the property herein
described to the payment of said obligations. There is no
proof of an intention to defraud the creditors of the firm, and
we think the conveyance is not fraudulent in law as against such
creditors. It is true that the effect of the conveyance is to aVOL. XXXV.-99
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propriate copartnership assets, in the first instance, to the satisfaction of other than copartnership liabilities; but such appropriation is not unlawful, being made in good faith. The
creditors of the firm have no lien upon the firm property. It
is the partner who has the lien or equity, and the partnership
creditors, by appropriate proceedings in court, may avail themselves of that equity through [that] lien, but not otherwise; and
if,by any means, that equity is extinguished as to either of the
partners in this case; for each of them has joined in a conveyance of the firm property and without reservation in behalf of
the creditors of the firm.
Speaking upon the subject, Mr. KnT says: "But creditors
have no lien upon the partnership for their debts. Their equity
is the equity of the partners, assenting to the payment of the
partnership debts. There are just and obvious principles of
equity, on which we need not enlarge, and they have been recognized and settled by a series of English and American decisions." 3 Kent Com. 65, side page.
In Bx parte .Ruffn, 6 Ves. 119-126, Lord ELDON said: "It
is the case of two partners who owed several joint debts, and had
joint effects. Under these circumstances their creditors who had
a demand upon them in respect of those debts had clearly no
lien whatsoever upon the partnership effects. They had no
power of suing and by process creating a demand that would directly attach upon the partnership effects. But they had no lien
upon or interest in them in point of law or equity. * * * In
all those ways the equity is not that of the joint creditors, but
that of the partners, with regard to each other, that operates to
the payment of the partnership debts.'
The same doctrine was recognized and applied in the subsequent ease of JExparte Williams, 11 Ves. 3-5, and DExparte
Kendell, 17 Yes. 526. In the latter this language was used:
c* * * and, in all these cases of distribution of joint effects, it
is by force of the equities of the partners among themselves that
the creditors are paid, not by force of their own claim upon the
assets, for they have none." Numerous cases are collected in
[the] note to the case of Silk v. Prime,2 Lead. Cas. Eq., pt. 1, pp.
393, 396, which sustain the proposition that the equities of
the partnership creditors depend upon the equities of the
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partnership themselves, and consequently may be defeated by
the bonafide appropriation of the firm's assets by the partners.
Judge STORY says that the partnership creditors have no
lien upon the partnership assets, but that they have equities
which they may work out through the lien of the partners; that
is, that "they have something approaching a lien, of which,
with the assent of the partners entitled to the lien, they may
avail themselves, in a court of equity, against the partnership
effects." Story Parner., §§ 97, 326, 360. The same author
calls the right of the firm creditors "a quasi lien upon the partnership effects, as a derivative subordinate right, under and
through the lien and equity of the partners." Story Partner.,
§ 361. This right is defined in similar terms in Ewell's Edition
of Lindley on Partnership *655, note 1.
The same rule and doctrine have been applied, without question, more than once in Tennessee. In Fain v. Jones, 3 Head.
309, this court, speaking through Judge WRIGHT, said: "The
general creditors of a firm have no lien upon the partnership
assets if the partners themselves have none. The claim of the
creditors must be worked out through the equities of the partners, and if they have none neither have the creditors."
In Howe v. Thompson, 3 Head. 515, Judge CARuTHERS, delivering the opinion of the court, used this language: "There
is no lien or other equity in favor of firm creditors upon the
partnership effects. This can only be fixed by judgment, like
other creditors. * * * The partners themselves have a right to
force the application of the partnership property to the payment
of the firm debts, and this right, sometimes called a lien, is
paramount to the right of a creditor of any member of the firm
to the interest of his individual debtor in the concerii. The
firm creditors in this way have the preference over the individual, to have satisfaction out of the joint property. In this
way, and for the benefit of the partners alone, a preference is
given to the joint creditors; so that any lien or equity the
creditor has is worked out through, and is entirely dependent
upon, that of the partners." To same effect is Allen v. Bank,
6 Lea 562, 563.
As ordinary creditors of an individual have no lien upon the
property, and cannot prevent him from disposing of it as he
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pleases, if be act in good faith, so the ordinary creditor of a
firm has no lien on the property of the firm so as to be able to
prevent a bonafide alienation of its property to whomsoever it
chooses. Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's Ed.) 655; 3 Kent
66; Story on Part., § 758; Howe v. Thompson, 3 Head. 515.
If the partners have the right to make absolute sale of partnership assets, it follows that they have the right to pledge or
mortgage such assets. Especially is this so when the individual
members of the firm are jointly bound, and equally bound, for
the payment of the debts secured, as in the case before us. This
court has recently held that a mortgage upon partnership real
estate, signed by the members of the firm, gave the mortgagee,
-who was the individual creditor of one member of"the firm,
a lien upon such real estate prior and superior to any claim of
partnership creditors against the same property as partnership
assets: Anderson v. Norton, 15 Lea 32. That was a stronger
case for the creditors of the firm than this; for here each member of the firm owes the debt secured, while there only one of
them owed it.
The case of Buck v. Johnson, 7 Lea 282, is relied upon by
counsel to sustain the contention that the trust conveyance here
impeached is fraudulent in law. We do not think that case authority for the position. On the contrary, we regard the opinion
then delivered by Judge TuRNEY as in accord with the general
doctrine announced in the several cases to which we have referred. There one member retired from the firm, the other
partner assuming the payment of all firm liabilities. The retiring partner retained "a lien equal to and like a mortgage" to
save him harmless against the firm debts and as security for
the amount the remaining partner was to " pay over" to him.
Subsequently the retiring partner conveyed such interest as he
had left in the firm to secure his individual debt. The decision
was that the creditors of the retiring partner acquired an interest
incumbered with the partnership debts, not because the partnership debts were in the first instance a lien upon the partnership
assets, but because the partners had stipulated, at the time of
dissolution, that the firm assets should be used in payment of
firm liabilites.
No more is Iavell v. Tucker, 5 Sneed 33, an authority for
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the position assumed by complainant in this case. There one
member of the firm assumed to pass the partnership assets by
an assignment for the benefit of the firm creditors and the individual creditor of that member. The decision was that the firm
creditors must be paid first. The power of the partners to sell
or convey in trust for any bonafide purpose they may choose was
not in terms or by implication denied in White v. Douherty,Mart.
& T. 308; Johnson v. Zing, 6 Humph. 233; or Bareroft v.

Snodgrass, 1 Coldw. 439. Nor was it decided in any of those
cases that firm creditors had anyinterest in or right to the assets
of the firm which they could make available otherwise than
through the equity of the partners themselves. The same is
true of Penningtonv. Bell, 4 Sneed 200; Insurance Co. v. Parter, 9 Heisk. 296, and Richardson v. Richardson, 1 Leg. Rep.
99.

The beneficiary in the deed of trust is entitled to the payment
of his debts out of the proceeds of the sale of the property conveyed. After that the surplus, if any, will be paid to the complainant who impounded the property by attachment. The decree of the Chancellor is affirmed, and the report of the commission of reference confirmed.
Costs of this court will be paid by complainant, and costs below as directed by the Chancellor.
NoTx. The question under discussion in the principal case has not appeared
in the courts so frequently as might be, at first blush, supposed; nor has it
been uniformly decided in the same way.
Where no actual fraud was imputed to the transaction it was said:
" The firm creditors at large of a
partnership have no lien on its assets,
any more than ordinary creditors
have upon the property of an individual debtor. The power of disposition over their property, inherent
in every partnership, is as unlimited
as that of an individual, and the
jus disponendi in the firm, all the
members co-opeiating, can only be
controlled by the same consideration
that imposes a limit upon the acts of
an individual owner, namely, that it

shall not be used for fraudulent purposes. So long as the firm exists,
therefore, its members must be at
liberty to do as they choose with
their own, and even in the act of dissolution they may impress upon its
assets such character as they please.
The doctrine that firm assets must
first be applied to the payment of
firm debts, and individual property
to individual debts, is only a principle of administration adopted by
the courts when from any cause they
are called upon to wind up the firm
business, and find that the members

790

CARVER GIN AND MACHINE CO. v. BANNON.

have made no valid disposition of, or
charge upon, its assets. Thus, when
upon a dissolution of the firm by
death or limitation or bankruptcy, or
from any other cause, the courts are
called upon to wind up the concern,
they adopt and enforce the principle
stated; but the principle itself springs
alone out of the obligation to do justice between the partners. The only
way to accomplish this is to so marshal the assets that property which
was owned in common shall be applied to the liabilities of its separate
owner, so that neither class of creditors shall be allowed to trespass upon
the fund belonging to the other, until
the claims of that other shall have
been satisfied. This right of the
creditors is, therefore, really the right
of their debtors, and inures to them
derivatively from the debtors. Hence
it is said that the lien or quasi-lien of
the creditor 'is worked out through
the partners,' the meaning of which
is that the firm creditors may demand
the primary application of the firm
assets to the payment of their debts,
because each one of the partners
would have a right to demand this as
agaisthiscopartners. It must follow,
therefore, that if at a time when the
firm was still in existence, when no
legal liens of any sort had attached,
when it was neither bankrupt nor
contemplating bankruptcy, all the
members have agreed to a particular
disposition of its assets, and that disposition is neither colorable nor fraudulent-that is to say, is upon a bona
fide consideration, and reserves no
benefit to the grantors-inasmuch as
none of the partners can be heard to
complain of such disposition, so none
of the creditors of the firm, or of the
individual members composing it, can
question or attack it.
"Conceding, as all the authorities
do, that the firm creditors had no in-

dependent right to demand to be first
paid, but derive that right solely
through and under the right which
the partners have to insist that this
shall be done, it is impossible to see
how the rule can be enforced where
all the members of the firm have, before the dissolution, and without any
ground to suspect fraud, given to the
assets a different direction :" Schmidloff v. CJurrie,55 Miss. 597. This case
was afterwards distinguished, and it
was held that a surviving member of a
firm might take the firm assets and
invest them in his individual business, and while it might be a fraud.
sufficient to justify the issuance of a
writ of attachment by a firm creditor,
it could not be sufficient for an individual creditor: _oah v..Branno,
57 Miss. 490. See Whitton v. Smit,
Freeman's Ch. 201.
So in Connecticut it was held that
an insolvent firm might make a bona
fid sale of the partnership property
and receive in payment stock of a
corporation in their individual names
and right, and that the creditors of
the firm could not follow and attach
the partnership property so sold.
The language of earlier cases was
considered strongly to support the
claim of the attaching creditors, but
not to warrant the action: Allen v.
Center VTalley Co., 21 Conn. 130, cited
in the in'eresting case of Beecher v.
Stevens, 43 Conn. 587.
-So in Ohio it was held that a firm
insolvent in the popular meaning
of the term, could sell its property to
pay a firm debt and a debt of an individual member of the firm, if a fair
value was paid: Siglerv.Knoz County
Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511. See Wi=z
v. Kelogg, 11 Ohio 394.
A firm consisted of five brothers.
Two of them withdrew, disposing of
their interest in the partnership assets to the other three, the latter
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The question was discussed quite
agreeing to pay the debt of the firm.
Some time after, one of the three re- vigorously by the Supreme Court of
maining sold his interest in the part- the United States in Core, Receiver, etc.,
nership property to one of the re- v. Beauregard,99 U. S. 119. It was
maining two partners. The two re- there held that so long as a partner
maining, after contracting debts, made retains an interest in the firm assets
an assignment of their partnership the creditors of the firm may avail
property to pay the debts of the last themselves of his equity, and enforce
firm, composed of the two; and it was the application of these assets priheld that the creditors of the firsttwo marily to the payment of the debts
firms had no right to claim any por- due them; but it is indispensable
tion of the fund last assigned, and that that the property, when the creditors
it was distributable exclusively among
the creditors of the last firm: Baker's
Appeal, 21 Pa. 76. The ruling announced in this case was applied in
Mfc2'ate v. Strayhorn, 39 Pa. St. 269,
where it was ruled that though the
general rule is that the equities of the
creditors are to be worked out through
the equities of the partners, yet
where the property is parted with by
sale severally made, and neither partner has dominion or possession, there
is nothing through which the equities of the creditors can be worked,
and, therefore, there is no case for the
application of the rule. See also
Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. 9.
So it has been held that where one
of two partners, with the consent of
the other, sells and conveys one-half
of the effects of the firm to a third
person, and the other firm afterwards
sells and conveys the other half to
the same person, such sale and conveyance are not prima facie void as
against the creditors of the firm, but
are primafacie valid as against allthe
world, and can be set aside by the
creditors of the firm only by proof
that the transactions were fraudulent
as against them: .imbaU v. Thompson, 13 Met. 283. See Tflack v. Charron, 29 Md. 311; Allen v. Central Valley Co., 21 Conn. 130; Bobb v.
Mudge, 14 Gray 534; Smith v. Edwards,7 Humph. 106; and Ladd v.
Griswold, 9 I11.25.

are simple contract creditors, should be
within the control of the court and in
the course of administration. If, before the interposition of the court,
the property has ceased to belong to
the partnership, if by a bonafide transfer it has becomethe several property,
either of one of the partners or of a
third person, the equities of the partners are extinguished, and, as a consequence thereof, the derivative equities of the creditors are gone. Affirmed in Core v. Beauregard,101 U.

S. 688; and reaffirmed in Fitzpatrick
v. Flannegan, 106 U. S. 648, citing
Schmidlapp v. Carrie, 55 Miss. 697;
Boach v. Brannon, 57 Miss. 490, and
BldrLdge v. Phillipson, 58 Miss. 270.
See Locke v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1;
.McGinty v. .1annagan,106 U. S.

661.
But the cases cited have not always
been followed, nor the ruling thereon
approved. Thus, in New York a
partnership made a conimon-law
assignment and provided that the
assignee should take possession of the
property and effects assigned, "and
sell and dispose of the same upon
such terms and conditions as may in
their judgment appear best and most
for the interest of the parties concerned, and convert the same into
money.' The assignment then provided for the payment in full of certain partnership and individual creditors; and after they were satisfied, it
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provided that certain other partnership and individual creditors should
be paid in full, if there were sufficient
assets, and if not, pro rated. This
assignment was held void by the
Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court has held that the assignment
violated no statute, but only a principle of the common law, which gives
partnership creditors a preference in
payment out of partnership property
over the individual creditors of the
several partners. Of the assignment
the Court of Appeals said: "It will
be conceded that the creditors of the
firm are, legally and equitably, first
entitled to the partnership effects.
Such creditors have a claim upon the
joint effects prior to every other person, which the court will enforce and
protect alike against the individual
partners and their creditors. Indeed,
the partnership property must be
exhausted in satisfying partnership
demands before resort can be had to
individual property of the members
of the firm. The firm is not liable
for the private debts of one of its
members, nor is there any liabilityresting upon the other members in respect
to those debts. An appropriation of
the firm property to pay the individual debt of one of the partners is, in
effect, a gift from the firm to the part.
ner-a reservation for the benefit of
such partner, or his creditors, to the
direct injury of the firm creditors.
Can it be reasonably doubted that,
when an insolvent firm assign their
effects for the payment of the private
debts of a member, for which neither
the firm nor the other members, nor
the firm assets nor the interest of the
other members therein are liable,
such an assignment and appropriation
are a direct fraud upon the joint
creditors of the assignors? An insolvent copartner, says the late Chancellor, who was unable to pay the

debts which the firm owed, would be
guilty of a fraud upon the joint creditors if he authorized his share of the
property of the firm to be applied to
the payment of a debt for which
neither he nor his property were
liable at law or in equity. (Kirby v.
Schoonmaker,3 Barb. Ch. 48; Buchanan
v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 207.) Yet
the co-assignor and copartner, Staples, does that in this case:" Wilson
v. .obertson, 21 N. Y. 587.
So when two members of a firm of
three mortgaged their interests to
secure individual debts, and the third
transferred his interest to a stranger,
it was held that a levy, under an
execution, for apartnership debt upon
the firm property, in the bands of a
purchaser under the mortgage, was
valid. So where two of a firm of
five members withdrew and transferred their interests to one of the
others, who continued the business,
although the old firm was dissolved,
the right of the creditors in respect
to past transactions, it was held, was
not thereby affected, but all the joint
property continued liable for the joint
debts as before, so long as the retiring
partners remained liable with the
others, for the partnership debts, and
no adverse orparamountrightsorliens
had attached; and the fact that one
purchased the interest of the retiring
partner as a partner, did not change
the character or legal effect of the
transaction; he simply acquired a
right, as to the two-fifths purchased,
to an account, and to share to that
extent-in the surplus of the property
of the firm. It was further said that
it seemed that the new firm acquired
the absolute right of disposal of the
property, and if it transferred the
same, in the absence of fraud, the
right of the creditors of the old firm
was lost; or if it incurred liabilities
and contracted debts, as between the
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creditors of the old and new firm, the
latter had the preference.
In the case two long opinions were
filed, and the cases of Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. 9, and Doner v. Stauffer,
1 Penn. & Watts (Pa.) 198, were
criticised and limited. The cases of
.Expart .Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119 ; Dimon v.
Hazard,32 N. Y. 65; Hobb v. Mtadge,
14 Gray 534; Smith v. Howard, 20
How. Pr. 121, and Bakes Appeal, 21
Pa. 76, were distinguished. The doctrine of the case we have previously
cited was said to lead to absurdities:
Menagh v. Whitwel, 52 N. Y. 146.
Wilson v. Robcrtson, 21 N. Y. 587;
s. c., 19 How. Pr. 350, has been followed inKnauthv. Bassett, 34.Barb. 31;
Scott v. Gutlhrie 25 How. Pr. 512;
Heyl v. .Bller,33 How. Pr. 266; s. c.,
2 Doly 231; Ruhl v. Phillips,2 Doly
45; Fasseitv. Tallmadge, 18 Abb. Pr.
43; O'Neil v. Solomon, 25 How. Pr.
246; Harlburt v. Dean, 2 Keyer 97;
2readwell v. Williams, 9 Bosw. 649;
Gri§'n v. Cranston, 30 Bosw. 1; Scott
v. Guthrie, 10 Bosw. 403; Ransom v.
on Deventer, 41 Barb. 307.
In Reith v. Fink, 47 fI. 272, it was
held that if an insolvent firm, by deed
of assignment, appropriate the firm
assets to the payment of the individual debts of one partner, the assignment is per so fraudulent and void
as to the firm creditors; so where the
individual debts of one partner are
assumed by the firm, strict proof will
be required of the honesty of such
transaction, that the consideration
was a valuable one, and for the benefit
of the partnership beyond all controversy. Even this was doubtingly
held.
In Goodbar v. Cary, 4 Woods C. C.
663, it was held that a conveyance of
its property by an insolvent firm to
pay the individual debts of its partners, contracted for money borrowed
to be used, and in fact used, in the
VOL. XXXV.-100

business of the firm, is a fraud on the
creditors of the firm, and at their
instance will be deemed void. The
cases of Schmidlaffv. Carrie,55 miss.
597, and Roach v. Brennon, 57 Miss.
490, were held not to apply to a case
in which the parties are bankrupt
and insolvent, so declared by their
deed of assignment, in which they
divest themselves of all their property
and rights in action, as was done in
the case before the court.
If a partner, for the purpose of
paying his individual debts, sells
firm property without the knowledge
of his copartners and with the intent
to defraud firm creditors, the purchaser acquires no title as against
such creditors: Hartley v. White, 94
Pa. St. 31. See Todd v. Lorah, 75 Pa.
St. 1.55; see where partners become
tenants in common: Rice v. Barnard,
20 Vt. 479.
S. held a contract, upon which certain money was to be received for the
benefit of L. & IL, who were partners.
L. & H. ordered the money, when received, to be paid over to A. L., to
whom the partnership was indebted,
and L., a surviving partner, after the
death of H. made a formal assignment
of the money to A. L., to be appropriated to the payment of his demands against the partnership. After
this S. received the money at different
times, and paid it over to A. L. The
plaintiff in the meantime summoned
S. and A. L. as trustees of L,. & II.
It was held that A. L. was entitled to
so much of the money as would satisfy
his demands against the partnership,
but that he was not entitled to retain
for the private debt of L., the surviving partner, nor for the debts of
other creditors of L. & H., to whom,
without any authority, he had said
that if there was any balance in his
favor, he would pay the debts: French
v. .ovejoy, 12 N. H. 458.
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Where an insolvent firm sold the
firm assets to a creditor in consideration of a certain sum in cash, and a
further sum, which was recited to be
the indebtedness of the firm to the
creditor, but which in fact embraced
indebtedness of the individual members of the firm, it was held that, in
securing a pecuniary benefit beyond
that which the law would secure, the
transaction was fraudulent and void
as to other creditors, and void, not
only as to the benefit thus received,
but in toto: Pritchettv. Pollock (Ala.),
2 Southern Rep. 735.
A similar ruling has been made in
Nebraska: Roop v. Herron, 17 N. W.
353.
In .Menagh,v. hitwell, supra, it was
said that if a bonafide sale were made
by a retiring partner, in a solvent
firm of two members, to his copart-

ner, and the latter assumed the debts,
the property formerly of the partnership becomes the separate property of
the purchasing partner, and the partnership creditors were not entitled to
any preference as against his individual creditors in case of his subsequent insolvency. The case of.Dimon
v. Hazard, 32 N.Y. 65, is cited in
favor of the proposition. The case
supports the statement; and the cases
of Rullitt v. CharterFund, 26 Pa. St.
108; Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cash. 555.
Other cases support this position:
Sage v. Chollar, 21 Barb. 596. See
Cory v. Long, 2 Sweeny 491; Goodbar
v. Cary, 16 Fed. Rep. 317 ; Crook v.
_indskopf, 12 N. E. Rep. 174, reversing 34 Hun. 457; Collomb v. Caldwell,
16 N. Y. 484.
W. W. THoRTo.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of 3Ftnnesota.
GRIBBLE v. PIONEER PRESS CO.
In an action for a libel, expressed in ordinary language, witnesses should
not be allowed to testify as to the meaning which they understood the libel to
convey, or that they understood it to apply to the plaintiff an offensive term
found in the article.
(Syllabus by the Court.)

A-PPEAL from District Court, Ramsey county.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for an alleged libel
contained in an article published in the issue of defendant's
newspaper of October 25, 1884, which, in commenting upon
certain libel suits against defendant then pending, stated "that
in the great majority of cases libel suits for pecuniary damages
are only brought against reputable newspapers by the meanest
sort of scallawap, shysters, and adventurers. For the most
part they are simply mercenary speculation upon the chance of
obtaining a verdict from an ignorant and prejudiced jury by the
aid of some crafty lawyer who is usually a partner in the spec-
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ulation; that is to say, the lawyer takes the case as a purely
business venture, on condition of his being paid half, or some
other proportion, of the amount of damages awarded if he should
succeed in bamboozling the jury. The Pioneer Press has been
pestered with a multitude of such libel suits, of which it has
now on hand six or seven, exclusive of Donnelly's mock contribution, almost without exception brought or instigated by notorious sharpers, shysters, confidence men, adventurers, and other
disreputable people, as a means of raising the wind, or occasionally as a sham plea in arrest of judgment, preparatory to
their fleeing from the country. Mr. Donnelly is more than
welcome to all the political advantage he can reap by enrolling
himself in this congenial company. Hlis able counsel, Mr.
Brisbin, is to be congratulated in having been chosen to represent the common griefs of Mr. Gribble and Mr. Donnelly in the
suits of these delectable worthies against the Pioneer Press."
Plaintiff had a verdict. From an order granting a new trial
plaintiff appeals.
Edwin Gribble, attorney, in person.
W. D. Cornish, for Pioneer Press Co., respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DicKIsor, J.-The alleged libel upon which this action is
brought will be found in the reporter's statement of the case.
Upon the trial of the cause the court permitted several witnesses
to testify that they, at the time of the publication, understood
the article as using the term "shyster" as applicable to the
plaintiff. Upon subsequent consideration, the learned judge who
tried the cause having come to the conclusion that such evidence
was inadmissible, a new trial was for that reason granthd, and
upon the same question the case is now before us for review.
We are of the opinion that the learned judge was right in his
conclusion that the evidence was not admissible: Van Vechten
v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 211 ; Gibson v. W/illiams, 4 Wend. 320 ;
Wright v. Paige, *42 N.Y. 581, 583, 584; Snell v. Snow, 13
Meto. 278; White v. Sayward, 33 le. 326 ; Rangier v. Hummd,
37 Pa. St. 130; McOue v. Ferguson,73 Pa. St. 333; Daines v.
Hartley, 3 Exch. 200; and see opinion of WA.JwomRT, Ch., in
Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560.
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This is in accordance with the principle of the law of evidence, which in general limits the testimony of witnesses to a
statement of the facts and circumstances within their knowledge,
to the exclusion of their opinions and mental conclusions concerning the very matter in issue. The exceptional grounds upon
which such evidence was deemed admissible in Blakeman v.
Blakeman, 31 Minn. 396, 18 N. W. Rep. 103, in an action for
slander, and in some other cases, is a recognition of the applicability to such cases in general of the ordinary rule of evidence.
No such exceptional reasons, no necessity, existed in this case
for the resort to such testimony to inform the jury as to whether
this printed publication was intended to apply the term ", shyster" to this plaintiff, and the reasons which in general forbid a
resort to such evidence were applicable here. The question to be
determined by the jury was, not what interpretation these witnesses had put upon the article when they read it, but what was
its meaning. This the jury could determine directly from
a reading of the article itself, and by the aid of such other facts
and circumstances as might affect the question. Whatever relevant facts, outside of the publication, could have enabled theqe
witnesses to form an intelligent opinion or understanding that
the offensive term was intended to be applied-to the plaintiff,
could have been placed before the jury, and the question in issue
should have been determined by the jury from the established
facts relevant to the issue, and not from the opinions or understanding of witnesses, which may have been based upon very
insufficient reasons. It would be a dangerous practice, not in
general to be resorted to, to apply in a court of justice for the
interpretation of the conduct of the language of men, the understanding, conclusions, opinions of others, which are too often
formed under circumstances not conducive to an impartial, mature, and correct judgment. That would be, in some degree, and
in some sense, to substitute the irresponsible, hasty opinions of
perhaps prejudiced minds, for the calm, deliberate judgment of
juries, acting under the sanctions and with the aids which attend
their deliberations. In the language of SHAW, 0. J., in a similar case (Snef v. Snow, supra),to resort to such evidence " would
be to make the defendant's liability depend, not on his own malicious intent and purpose in using the language, which might be
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quite innocent, aud free from blame, but upon the misconceptions or morbid imagination of the person in whose hearing they
were spoken."
There were no peculiar circumstances, either as respects the
language employed, or the manner of its utterance or publication, to justify a departure from the ordinary rules of evidence.
The effect of this testimony was simply to present to the jury
the opinions of these witnesses as to the meaning of the libel,
and that it was intended to apply to the plaintiff the offensive
term used in the article. It cannot be said that this testimony
was harmless, and cannot have affected the result, unless it is to
bealso declared that the libelous article bears upon its face, and
by necessary legal construction, the meaning and application
which is given to it in this testimony. This we cannot declare.
We deem that to be a question proper for the consideration of a
jury, not necessarily to be determined from the article alone, but
from it in connection with such circumstances as may be relevant
to the question. As this may come before another jury for determination upon such evidence as shall there be presented, we
refrain from commenting upon this feature of the case.
The order granting a new trial is affirmed.
BERRY, J., on account of illness, took no part in this decision.
While the general principle that a
witness called to prove a fact is to be
confined to a statement of that fact
to the exclusion of any opinion that
he may entertain respecting it, is, undoubtedly, founded, not only on authority, but on reason itself, it, like
every other rule of evidence, must
present its exceptions.
The case of a person called to testify to (say) a murder that he saw
committed differs widely from the
case of a person called to prove
that certain words of an alleged libelous character have been written
concerning any one, for, in the first
case, the killing, in and by itself, is,
manifestly, a most grievous wrong;
but, in the second case, the words
used are harmful only in consequence

of the impression they make upon
the mind of him that reads them.
In the present case the court holds
that " witnesses should not be allowed
to testify as to the meaning which
they understood the libel to convey,
or that they understood it to apply to
the plaintiff an offensive teem found
in the article."
In other words, the witnesses in an
action for damages against a newspaper for an alleged libelous publication are to be confined to the single
point that they read certain words in
a certain newspaper published by the
defendant, and,having delivered themselves of this fact, the determination
of the meaning of the alleged words,
and to whom they were applied, is to
be left to the court and jury.
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The phrase, "the liberty of the
press," is, certainly, very ear-catching, but the analysis of the phrase
reveals something less evidently admirable; for, what is the press, divested of the accessories of the many
striking names that distinguish the
innumerable newspapers that together
constitute that powerful abstraction?
Simply a number of individual men
that write anonymous articles upon
every subject, personal and impersonal, that is to be found between the
boundaries of Heaven on the one
side and those of Hell on the other.
For the most part it must be said,
to the honor of the men connected
with this mighty abstraction, the
press deals fairly in its comments on
persons and things, and when it does
so its influence is only for good; but,
occasionally, when it quits things impersonal to deal with things personal
its beneficence is not always quite so
manifest.
The change of the rule that the
question whether the words written
or spoken were to be considered libelous or slanderous was one of law
to be determintd by the court, to the
present general rule that the jury is
the judge not only of the fact of publication, but, also, whether the publication is libelous or slanderous, has,
undoubtedly, been a great gain to the
person assailed. But is this enough
protection to that other, and often
helpless, abstraction, the public?
Words taken by themselves are
simply signs for the eye, or sounds
for the ear, and it is only the sense
drawn from them by the person under whose notice they come that
gives them any value. Words that
would seem to one man to be quite
harmless would seem to another to be
atrocious; wherefore, if the object of
the private action of libel be to protect the individual from unwarranted

assaults upon his reputation it seems
quite inadequate to confine the witnesses to a simple statement of the
form of words used instead of permitting them to supplement their
testimony with the impression made
upon their intellects, for it is only
that impression that works the harm.
To say that the jury can fairly
determine the injury done without a
knowledge of the impression pfoduced
by the words upon the witnesses is to
ignore a most important element in
the case. When the words are first
heard or read by the witnesses, they
enter their intellects without any preparation for their reception, and,
consequently, their effect must be
more startling and profound than
when they are preceded by the many
preliminaries that lead up to their
presentation to the jury. Again,
unless the jury fitly represents the
average sentiments of the vicinage, it
is manifest that it cannot fairly measure the injury done. Perhaps in villages and small towns any twelve
men, brought together in the manner
ordinarily employed in choosing a
jury, would be fair representatives of
the neighborhood, and, in such circumstances, probably, substantial justice would be secured by a mere
recital of any alleged libelous words.
But will the most enthusiastic encomiast of the "jury system" pretend
that, in any large city, the average
jury represents the average virtue or
intelligence of such city ?
Unless it does, it is manifest that
the impression produced upon it by
any form of words is not a just criterion of the impression produced upon
the community, and it is only-and
especially in such a case as slander or
libel-as the jury fairly represents
the whole body whence it is drawn
that its verdict can do substantial
justice.
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It may be objected that, if the witnesses are permitted to give their
subjective impressions of the meaning intended in any alleged libelous
writing, the attention of the jury will
be diverted from the fact in issue to
the opinions of the witnesses, many
of whom may be biased by reason of
their relations to the person claiming
damages, or unable to judge accurately the importance of the words in
question by reason of their being
hypersensitive or otherwise wanting
in proper powers of discrimination.
While undoubtedly, the objection
has some force, yet, as the plaintiff
seeks redress, not for the shape of the
letters composing the words that
strike the eyes of the readers, or their
sound as they strike their ears, but
simply for their effect on the understanding of those to whom they are
conveyed, it seems nothing extravagant to ask that their effect should be
made known to the body upon whom
rests the duty of determining what, if
any, injury has been done to the
plaintiff.
It certainly may be left to the ingenuity of the defendant's counsel
and the wisdom of the court to neutralize any extravagance that may
-appear to characterize the testimony
of the witnesses, and thus the possible
harm resulting from the views here
presented will be reduced to a minimum; while, on the other hand, the
cause of justice will be greatly furthered.
If the ascertainment of the meaning of the words, taken by themselves,
be alone the proper object of inquiry
on the part of the court and jury,
then the action of libel is reduced to
a question of etymology, and each
trial becomes a more or less instructive lesson in which the jury acts as a
tribunal for finding the meaning of
words of doubtful signification. As it

is conceivable that juries in libel cases
may not always agree in their several
judgments on the words whose meanings they may be called upon to
determine, the merits of this arrangement are not entirely obvious.
Whatever may be thought of the
truth or falsity of the hypothesis proposed by Darwin-an author about
whose views every one seems to have
an opinion, though comparatively few
appear to think it necessary to read
his works as a preliminary exerciseto account for the existent, history
certainly shows an orderly progression, not only of facts, but of ideas,
and the development of the law of
libel forms no exception to the general rule that things are what they
are because of what has preceded
them.
It is well known that, down to the
time of Charles II, to limit the attention to England, not only was the
determination of the question of libel
or no libel confined to the court, but
the court could, if it saw fit, interpret
any alleged libelous words in mitiori
sensv, and, as a consequence of this
power, some of the courts displayed
a knowledge of casuistry that would
do credit to an expert in moral
theology.
Air. Odger, in his treatise on Slander and Libel, p. *96, et seq., presents some very interesting and instructive specimens of this form of
judicial subtlety.
It is manifest that, under such a
system, it simply rested with the
individual judge sitting in any case
to determine whether the defendant
should be held responsible for the
words used by him concerning the
plaintiff, and, as a consequence, the
aggrieved plaintiff often obtained the
privilege of paying the costs, as a
recompense for having been maligned
by the defendant. In the case of
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Lord Townsend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod.
159 (28 and 29 Car. II), a case of
scandalum magnatum, the rule was so
far altered that the judges were held
bound to interpret alleged libelous
words in their ordinary sense; but
as even this relaxation of the ancient
rule failed to produce substantial
justice in many instances, the statute
of the 32 Geo. III, e. 60, directed
that the question of libel or no libel
should rest with the jury. Since the
enactment of this statute, there has
been no important change in the
rule, and the present practice, both
in England and most of the United
States, is as it was then established.
Undoubtedly, the law as it stands
to-day, is a vast improvement upon
its condition at any past period, but,
even so, another step, the one contended for here, which is the logical
development of the present state of
the law, seems to be necessary in
order that a man's reputation be
adequately protected from reckless or
malicious assaults upon it.
Many cases might be cited in illustration, but, for the sake of brevity, a
few must suffice.
In Dairesv. Hartley, 3 Exch. 200,
decided Dec. 5, 1848, which was
an action for slander, the objectionable words used by the defendant
were, "You (certain traders) must look
sharp to get-those bills met by them"
(the plaintiffs). At the trial before
PoL.Locx, 0. B., a witness testified to
having heard the words, and being
asked by counsel for the plaintiffs,
" What did you understand by that?"
the question was objected to and rejected. A verdict having been rendered for the defendant, a rule nisi
was obtained by plaintiffs upon the
ground that the question should have
been allowed.
In discharging the rule, PoLLocx,
C. B., said that the question was im-

proper because "taken by itself, and
without more, the understanding of a
person who hears an expression is not
the legal mode by which it is to be
explained. If words are uttered or
printed, the ordinary sense of those
words is to be taken to be the meaning of the speaker; but no doubt a
foundation may be laid by something
else that has occurred; some other
matter may be introduced; and then,
when that has been done, the witness
may be asked, with reference to that
other matter, what was the sense in
which he understood the words. But
the mere question, 'What did you
understand with reference to such an
expression?' we think is not the
correct mode of putting the question."
Now, while the above opinion shows
a distinct unwillingness on the part
of the court to admit the subjective
impression of the witness concerning
the words in question, it also seems
to show a conviction that the withholding of that impression is depriving the jury of a substantial element
in the case.
Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560,
decided in 1831, and referred to by
the court in the case under discussion, was an action of libel against a
newspaper for charging Beardsley
with official misconduct as U. S. District Attorney, and a witness was
asked his understanding of the article
containing the alleged libelous words.
The question was overruled, and AL=-xi,Senator, in concurring with the
Chancellor in sustaining the rejection
of the question, rests his opinion on
the ground that, if the construction of
one witness may be given, so may that
of another, "which, instead of determining any point of fact, would only
tend to a confusion of ideas, embarrassing, instead of informing or enlightening the mindsof theijry" Which
again seems about equivalent to say-
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ing that as contradictory testimony
tends to confuse the jury, all such
testimony had better be excluded, and
each action should consist, not in the
evidence of both parties thereto, but
only that of one. Possibly, the question as to which one should be permitted to offer his evidence might be
settled by pitching a penny before
the jury is sworn.
Borchenius v. Ndson, 52 fll. 236,
decided in 1869, was anactionof slander, in which Mrs. Nelson, the wife of
the defendant, was charged with having said of the plaintiff that he was
"a villain, a rascal, and a cheater" in
his business. LINvRENCE, J., in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, considers the objections to witnesses being permitted to give their
understanding of the words, and says:
"It may well be asked what better
guide (to their meaning) there is
than to ascertain how they (the
words) were understood by the bystanders. It has been held that, if
the words are ambiguous, and the
hearers understand them in an actionable sense, it is sufficient, for it is this
which caused the damage, and if a
foreign language is employed it must
appear to have been understood by
the hearers." After stating that the
jury is not bound by the witnesses'
construction of the words, he adds,
"it is admissible in evidence, as tending to show what meaning hearers of
common understanding would and
did ascribe to them"
This opinion is interesting and
instructive, not only for the reasoning
of the court in the case before it, but
for the citations and criticisms of a
number of English and American decisions on the subject.
Waller v. Tribune Co., 29 Fed. R.
827 (U. S. C. C., N. Dist. III., Feb.
14, 1887, opinion by BLonGLr=, J.),
shows a conflict between the state and
VOL. XXXV.-101

federal courts in the same locality.
This was an action of libel by Walker, a member of the bar and an author,
against the Tribune for using the following language: "The pamphlet
on the Paine Bribery case and the
United States Senate, by Albert H.
Walker, is plainly the effusion of a
crankY In sustaining a demurrer to
the declaration, the court held that
the word "crank" is not actionable
per se, as it is not necessarily defamatory, and, also, that it is no libel to underrate an author's talents. In other
words, the court holds that, unless
any given word is plainly defamatory,
the unlucky wight to whom it may
be applied is without redress. As
such an elegant term as "crank" is
susceptible of other than a defamatory construction, it would seem that,
under the foregoing decision, it may
be applied quite freely.
To the propositionthat it is no libel
to underrate an authors talents there
can be but slight dissent, but, at the
same time, it is worth remembering
that between literary criticism and
literary ruffianism there is a broad
distinction.
One more case, and this from Pennsylvania, and the present note will
end.
-Pittsburgh, A. & . R'y Co. v.
fcCurdy, 19 W. N. C. 163, was decided
February 7, 1887, by the Supreme
Court, in an opinion through Ci..&i,
J.
In the court below, McCurdy
brought an action of libel against the
railway company, which had discharged him from the position of
conductor, for posting up a notice
that he "had been di~charged for
failure to ring up all fares collectedY
On the trial of the cause, some witnesses for the plaintiff were asked,
under objection and exception by
defendant, what was their understand-
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ing of the notice. The verdict and
judgment were for the plaintiff.
In the opinion, reversing the lower
court, the Supreme Court holds that
the question should not have been
admitted for the reason that, although
the notice was not to be taken in
miliori senau, yet, as it was susceptible
of an innocent interpretation, viz.:
that the conductor was forgetful or
careless about using the punch, the
company should not be held liable,
notwithstanding the impression it
may have made upon any of the witnesses. The court rests its opinion
largely on the case of .Raugler v.
Hummd, 1 Wr. 130, in which the
impressions ofwitnesses were excluded
upon the ground that, if they were
admitted, "there would be no use for
an innuendo. Its office would be'supplied by the oath of witnesses, who
would draw their inferences from precedent facts instead of the jury. This
is not permissible.'
The above opinion seems to indicate, in spite of the court's disavowal
of the doctrine that words may be
taken in mitio i sermu, that, whenever
the reputation of an individual is
attacked, he shall have no redress
against his assailant unless he can
show that the words do not admit of

any meaning but one that is offensive.
If this be sound law, then, indeed,
is the press, and every other engine
of possible anonymous verbal abuse,
quite safe to send forth the most
opprobrious criticism, if only the
meaning of the words used is susceptible of being juggled into an
innocent sense.
The two cases last noticed seem to
show a disposition in the courts to
resume their ancient power in cases
of libel and slander, and to reserve to
themselves the determination of the
import of the words upon which such
cases are founded. But, notwithstanding this manifestation of judicial anxiety to retain as much of its
original power as possible, it can
scarcely be doubted that the law of
human development, which shows
itself so markedly in the constantly
increasing importance of the individual, will bring about the general
acceptance of the doctrine that, in
cases of libel and slander, their very
essence consists in the impression
made ul'on the intellects of the persons under whose notice the words
in question may have come.
WILLIAM EHNm
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